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Abstract 
We iteratively develop and test a model to clarify the relationship between both high and low 
levels of social (influence) and personal (autonomy) power. A meta-analysis synthesising 
primary data (n = 298) and secondary data (n = 498) found that impaired personal power 
coincided with impaired social power, but not vice versa. Unexpectedly, elevated social 
power did not coincide with elevated personal power, suggesting that the association between 
influence and autonomy attenuates with increasing levels of power. Predictions arising from 
the meta-analysis and our revised theoretical model were supported in a subsequent study (n 
= 266). We discuss implications of these findings and avenues for future research. 
Keywords: power, influence, autonomy 
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Does Influence Beget Autonomy?  
Clarifying the Relationship between Social and Personal Power 
Power implies an ability to influence others (social power/influence), and to resist the 
influence of others (personal power/autonomy) (Dépret & Fiske, 1993). However, recent 
conceptual disagreements (see Pratto, 2016) together with a lack of empirical data on the 
relationship between social and personal power have highlighted gaps in our understanding of 
power. Scholars have voiced opinions regarding the link between social and personal power 
(e.g., Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006), but empirical evidence is lacking to corroborate key 
assumptions (reviewed below). Furthermore, previous work has focused on the relationship 
between different facets of high power, largely ignoring the relationship between different 
facets of low power. In the present research we seek to rectify this, clarifying the relationship 
between both high and low levels of social and personal power. 
Power is multifaceted. In the broadest sense, power can be thought of as the ability to 
determine personally relevant rewards and punishments (Russell, 2004). In the social domain 
this implies the ability to control others and resist the control of others. Similar implications 
can be derived from contemporary definitions of power. Power is often argued to arise from 
asymmetric control over valued resources (Dépret & Fiske, 1993). In this view, power 
implies influence, via one’s relative control over resources valued by others, but also a 
resistance to influence, via one’s relative control over resources valued by the self. The 
former can be traced back to traditional notions of social power, in which power arises from 
control over resources valued by others, resulting in the actual, or potential, exercise of 
influence over people or groups (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; French, Raven, & Cartwright, 1959). 
An example of social power is the influence a manager exerts over his/her employees. On the 
other hand, the ability to resist the influence of others is equated with notions of autonomy 
and personal power. It describes the ability to control one’s own outcomes, and implies 
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independence from others (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Van 
Dijke & Poppe, 2006). The distinction between social power/influence and personal 
power/autonomy has become more common in recent years, proving useful in explaining the 
nuanced effects of power in numerous domains (e.g., motivation, stereotyping; Lammers et 
al., 2009; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). 
Even though social and personal power are theoretically distinct, it is widely assumed 
that in practice elevated influence coincides with elevated autonomy, and impaired influence 
with impaired autonomy. Indeed, empirical work shows that influence and autonomy are 
correlated (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). Moreover, experimental work has also shown 
that typical states of power engender both feelings of greater autonomy and influence; 
conversely, typical states of powerlessness instigate both feelings of impaired autonomy and 
influence (Lammers et al., 2016). 
It has been suggested that control over others affords personal freedom (Lammers et al., 
2016; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). Supporting this, positions that grant influence (e.g., 
occupation, age) often afford autonomy (Sheldon, Kasser, Houser-Marko, Jones, & Turban, 
2005; Weaver, 1977). Likewise, power-holders are more likely to exert control over their 
immediate environment (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), and to pursue their goals in 
an autonomous fashion (Galinsky et al., 2008; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; 
Laurin et al., 2016). The fact that people seem to consider autonomy more consequential than 
influence is also consistent with this view. When given the choice to increase their autonomy 
or their influence, people are more likely to increase the former (Lammers et al., 2016; Van 
Dijke & Poppe, 2006), and such increases can satiate a general need for power (Inesi, Botti, 
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Lammers et al., 2016). Thus, there is good reason to 
believe that everything else being equal, high social power affords high personal power. 
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The question whether high personal power affords high social power has received less 
attention. Work on romantic relationships suggests that in the event that one partner becomes 
more independent, they may also become more influential (Rusbult & Buunk, 1993). 
Likewise, partners who focus more on their own autonomy report greater perceptions of 
power and being able to have a greater say in their relationships (Neff & Harter, 2002). 
However, other studies indicate that high autonomy reduces the desire to impose upon one’s 
partner (Hodgins & Knee, 2002), and fosters less forceful approaches to conflict with 
strangers (Knee, Neighbors, & Vietor, 2001). Furthermore, parenting styles that grant 
children extreme levels of autonomy have been shown to promote behaviours aimed at 
influencing others (e.g., bullying; Olweus, 1994). However, similar outcomes are also 
associated with overly authoritarian parenting (Schwartz, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1997). 
Taken together, it stands to reason that high personal power may not always afford high 
social power and a causal relationship from high personal to high social power may be 
moderated by additional factors. 
As indicated earlier, the relationship between low personal power and low social power 
has been largely neglected. Looking at historical examples of groups whose autonomy was 
restricted (e.g., minorities, women) one typically finds that they had very little influence (e.g., 
Modood et al., 1997). Likewise, low-autonomy jobs do not typically afford the ability to 
influence others (e.g., Weaver, 1977). Furthermore, prolonged states of impaired autonomy 
can lead to feelings of powerlessness and social insignificance (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978), but may be alleviated by increases in social influence (Inesi et al., 2011), 
suggesting that reduced personal power implies reduced social power.  
Conversely, impairments in social power do not seem to necessitate reductions in 
personal power. Lacking some forms of influence (e.g., responsibility) may in fact be 
beneficial for autonomy. For example, lacking familial or cultural responsibility can engender 
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feelings of autonomy (Fuligni, 1998). Furthermore, when influence is impaired one’s 
motivation to gain autonomy is not amplified (Lammers et al., 2016). Since people are 
generally motivated to alleviate impairments in their autonomy (Lefcourt & Telegdi, 1971), 
this would suggest that lacking social power does not imply a lack of personal power.  
Present Research 
Based on the above literature, we hypothesised that high social power affords high 
personal power, but high personal power does not afford high social power. This hypothesis 
is consistent with the notion that gaining social power is a route via which people seek to gain 
personal power (Lammers et al., 2016; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). Furthermore, extending 
current theorising, we expect low personal power to afford low social power, but not vice 
versa. These predictions are summarised in our theoretical model (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model depicting the relationship between social and personal power.  
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To provide an empirical test of our theoretical model, we examined data derived from 
experimental studies in which participants recalled a previous experience of elevated (k = 4) 
or impaired (k = 3) social or personal power, and then described how much autonomy and 
influence they experienced in said event. By synthesizing primary data (n = 298) and 
secondary data (n = 498; Lammers et al., 2016; Lammers et al., 2009) from studies conducted 
in different contexts and with different samples, we sought to provide a robust test of our 
predictions, making an important step towards understanding how different facets of power 
are related. Note that previous work did not report inferential statistics for the effects of social 
power on autonomy, or personal power on influence (see Lammers et al., 2009; Lammers et 
al., 2016). These comparisons are crucial in testing our hypotheses and provide a critical 
extension of previous research. 
Study 1 
Participants and Design  
Primary Data. Two-hundred and ninety-eight participants (243 female; Mage = 19.46, 
SDage = 2.69) from a European University participated in exchange for course credit. The 
sample size was determined a-priori and provided over 90% power at  = .05 to detect a 
medium sized effect (based on Lammers et al., 2016). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of five experimental conditions (described below). 
Secondary Data. Lammers and colleagues’ (2009) sample consisted of 112 
participants (73 female; Mage = 21.40) recruited from a European University. Furthermore, 
Lammers and colleagues (2016) sampled 205 participants (Study 4a: 80 female; Mage = 
30.10) from the U.S. and 181 participants (Study 4b: 64 female; Mage = 30.10) from India; 
both recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.Participants were randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions in all studies. 
Procedure and Materials 
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Primary Data. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were greeted by a male 
experimenter and seated in a private cubicle. All instructions were provided in written format 
and delivered on a PC. The experimenter remained blind to the allocation of participants to 
experimental conditions, which was controlled by an algorithm. Participants commenced the 
main part of the study after providing informed consent and the experimenter had left the 
cubicle. To investigate different states of power participants recalled and described an event 
in which they: (1) had control over others (high social power), or (2) had no control over 
others (low social power), or (3) were uncontrolled by others (high personal power), or (4) 
were controlled by others (low personal power). We also included a fifth condition in which 
participants recalled the last time they went grocery shopping. In absence of an adequately 
validated neutral or baseline condition for the present investigation we adopted the grocery 
scenario, which was used in several previous studies on (social) power (e.g., Inesi, 2010; 
Rucker & Galinsky, 2009; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). 
The recall task lasted for seven minutes. Participants then indicated, on two-item 
measures, how much influence (e.g., “How much control [influence] did you have over what 
would, or did, happen to another individual or individuals?”; social = .85, Msocial = 4.01, 
SDsocial = 2.49) and autonomy (e.g., “How much control [influence] did you have over what 
would, or did, happen to you?”; personal = .89, Mpersonal = 5.61, SDpersonal = 2.56) they 
experienced in the situation described in their essays (1 = Not at all; 9 = Very Much). At the 
end, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Secondary Data. The materials and measures employed by Lammers and colleagues 
were highly similar to the materials and measures described above (see also Table S1, 
Supplementary Materials), except that (a) the data collection was carried out online, (b) 
Lammers et al. (2009) did not include low power conditions, and (c) Lammers et al. (2016) 
did not employ neutral conditions and assessed influence and autonomy on 7-point scales. 
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Results and Discussion 
All primary data were collected prior to analyses. In our presentation of the result below 
we employ a meta-analytic approach (see Cumming, 2013) and model variations between 
populations with random-coefficients to identify trends that generalise across studies. Effect 
sizes for pair-wise comparisons are estimated from standardized mean differences (Hedges’ 
g, Hedges, 1981), and weighted via an inverse-variance method (Higgins & Green, 2011, 
Chapter 9). Means, standard deviations, and standardized mean differences are in the forest 
plots below (Fig. 2-5). Furthermore, Table S2 provides a concise overview of all means and 
standard deviations.  
Manipulation Check 
First we sought to confirm the basic effects of the manipulations—that influence 
increases with social power, and autonomy with personal power. As expected, high social 
power episodes were associated with more influence than low social power episodes, g = 
1.62, 95% CI [0.37, 2.87], Zcombined = 2.54, n = 297, pcombined = .010 (Figure 2, top), and high 
personal power episodes were associated with greater autonomy than low personal power 
episodes, g = 2.10, 95% CI [0.84, 3.37], Zcombined = 3.26, n = 327, pcombined < .001 (Figure 2, 
bottom). 
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Figure 2. Forest plots for the comparison between feelings of influence in episodes of high 
and low social power (top), and feelings of autonomy in episodes of high and low personal 
power (bottom). 
 
Main Analyses 
Moving on to the main analyses, we address each horizontal pathway in Figure 1, first 
testing the relationship between elevated and then between impaired states of social and 
personal power. 
High Social Power  High Personal Power. Episodes of high social power were 
experienced as less autonomous than episodes of high personal power, g = -0.70, 95% CI [-
1.29, -0.11], Zcombined = 2.33, n = 391, pcombined = .020 (Figure 3, top), and no more 
autonomous than episodes of low social power, g = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.77], Zcombined = 
0.46, n = 297, pcombined = .640 (Figure 3, bottom). Thus, unexpectedly, this suggests that 
episodes of elevated social power were not associated with increased autonomy. 
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Figure 3. Forest plots for the comparison between feelings of autonomy in episodes of high 
social power and high personal power (top), and of high social and low social power 
(bottom).  
 
High Personal Power  High Social Power. Moving on, we found that high 
personal power episodes afforded less influence than high social power episodes, g = -1.03, 
95% CI [-1.76, -0.30], Zcombined = 2.76, n = 377, pcombined = .006 (Figure 4, top), but more 
influence than low personal power episodes, g = 0.44, 95% CI [0.44, 0.66], Zcombined = 3.96, n 
= 327, pcombined < .001 (Figure 4, middle). This latter result was unexpected, although the 
difference between high personal and low personal power episodes was relatively small and 
less than one scale point  when examined as a non-standardised mean difference (Mdiff = 
0.70). Probing these results further, feelings of influence did not differ between high personal 
power and neutral episodes, g = 0.29, 95% CI [-0.72, 1.31], Zcombined = 0.57, n = 208, pcombined 
= .570 (Figure 4, bottom), but differed between low personal power and neutral episodes, g = 
-0.60, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.23], t(119) = 3.33, p = .001. Together, these results suggest that 
impaired personal power may lower influence, but elevated personal power may not 
necessarily increase influence, consistent with our theoretical model. 
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Figure 4. Forest plots for the comparison between feelings of influence in episodes of high 
personal power and high social power (top), of high personal power and low personal power 
(middle), and of high personal power and neutral episodes (bottom).  
 
Low Personal Power  Low Social Power. Consistent with our theoretical model, 
influence was similarly impaired in low social power episodes and in low personal power 
episodes, g = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.49], Zcombined = 1.16, n = 311, pcombined = .250 (Figure 5). 
Furthermore, as indicated above feelings of influence differed between low personal power 
and neutral episodes. In combination, these results corroborate the conclusion that impaired 
personal power coincides with low levels of influence. 
 
Figure 5. Forest plot for the comparison between feelings of influence in episodes of low 
social power and low personal power. 
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Low Social Power  Low Personal Power. Recall that episodes of low social power 
were associated with the same level of autonomy as episodes of high social power. At the 
same time, episodes of low social power conferred lower levels of autonomy than neutral 
episodes. This latter result was unexpected but derives from a single sample and is henceforth 
perhaps more tentative, g = -0.43, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.07], t(117) = 2.40, p = .021. Crucially, 
autonomy was markedly higher in episodes of low social power compared to episodes of low 
personal power, g = 1.13, 95% CI [0.32, 1.94], Zcombined = 2.74, n = 311, pcombined = .006 
(Figure 6). On balance, these results are consistent with the notion that low social power does 
not imply low personal power.  
 
Figure 6. Forest plot for the comparison between feelings of autonomy in low social power 
and low personal power episodes. 
 
Further Exploratory Analyses 
Unexpectedly, we found that having high social power did not afford high personal 
power. To further explore this result, we performed additional exploratory analyses, which 
indicated that episodes of high social power were experienced as more autonomous than 
episodes of low personal power, g = 1.41, 95% CI [0.78, 2.04], Zcombined = 4.38, n = 354, 
pcombined < .001 (Figure 7, top). Furthermore, high social power episodes conferred a similar 
level of autonomy as neutral episodes, g = -0.09, 95% CI [-0.69, 0.51], Zcombined = 0.29, n = 
194, pcombined = .770 (Figure 7, bottom). This suggests that gaining high social power may be 
a viable route via which individuals can restore impaired autonomy, albeit not attain the same 
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high levels of autonomy as might be afforded by episodes of high personal power (see 
analysis above). 
 
Figure 7. Forest plot for the comparison between feelings of autonomy in episodes of high 
social power and low personal power (top), and of high social power and neutral episodes 
(bottom). 
 
All in all, Study 1 provided support for the notion that low personal power affords low 
social power but not vice versa. In contrast, the proposed link between high social and high 
personal power was not supported.  
Study 2 
The pattern of results obtained in Study 1 suggests that the association between social 
and personal power strengthens with diminishing levels of power, and weakens with 
increasing levels of power. In what follows, we report the results of a correlational study to 
test these predictions. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two-hundred and eighty-seven participants took part in this correlational study. The 
study was conducted online and we only considered responses from participants who 
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completed all parts of the survey. Twenty-one participants failed pre-planned attention checks 
(e.g., “If you are reading this please select 4”), leaving a final sample of 266 participants 
(230 females, Mage = 19.89, SDage = 4.21).  
Procedure and Materials 
Study materials were embedded in a mass-test conducted with first and second year 
undergraduate students, and appeared alongside a range of unrelated scales. Data were 
gathered in two waves in autumn 2016 and spring 2017. To measure social power, 
participants completed the Sense of Power scale (Anderson et al., 2012), an 8-item measure 
of individuals’ enduring beliefs in how much influence and control they exert over others 
(e.g., “I can get other to do what I want”; “My ideas and opinions are often ignored” (R)). 
Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Completely False) to 5 (Completely 
True). Personal power was assessed using a three-item scale developed by Cichocka et al. 
(2016), and participants indicated how much control they had over their own outcomes on a 
scale ranging from 1 (I feel I have little control over my life; I have little influence on my fate; 
There are many things in my life I cannot influence) to 7 (I feel I have great control over my 
life; I have great influence on my fate; There are few things in my life I cannot influence).
Results and Discussion 
Data Preparation 
We averaged the social power ( = .87, M = 4.43, SD = .96) and the personal power 
( = .71, M = 4.69, SD = 1.28) items to form composites after recoding negatively worded 
items. As anticipated, the two composites were positively correlated, r(264) = .21, p < .001. 
Main Analysis 
To examine the association between social and personal power at different levels of 
power, we performed a quantile regression using a rank inversion method to derive 
confidence intervals (Koenker, 2005). In particular, we probed the association between 
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personal power and social power at different levels of social power (0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 0.80, 
and 0.90 quantiles) and, in a separate analysis, at different levels of personal power (0.10, 
0.20, 0.50, 0.80, and 0.90 quantiles). As can be seen in Figure 8, the regression slopes were 
significant for lower quantiles (social power quantiles: 0.10, 0.20; personal power quantiles: 
0.10), but levelling off and not significant for higher quantiles (with the exception of the 0.80 
quantile for which the slopes were shallower but significant due to a smaller standard error). 
As anticipated, this suggests that the association between social and personal power grew 
stronger for lower levels of power and became weaker for higher levels of power. A similar 
pattern of results was obtained for the intercept (not depicted graphically), which appeared to 
level off with increasing levels of power, although this was only the case in the quantile 
regression with personal power as outcome variable. 
 
Figure 8. Intercepts (2nd column) and slopes (3rd column) of estimated linear quantile 
regressions, with slopes plotted for different quantiles () (outer right); OLS estimates are 
shown as a red line and associated confidence intervals as red dotted line in electronic 
materials provided online. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of the present research was to develop a model that spells out the relationship 
between social and personal power. Synthesising primary and secondary data derived from 
different samples, Study 1 provided support for the assumption that everyday manifestations 
of low personal power coincide with low levels of influence and hence a lack of social power. 
In contrast, and as predicted, lacking social power does not necessarily imply a lack of 
autonomy and hence does not always coincide with low personal power. However, contrary 
to our model and popular belief (e.g., Lammers et al., 2016; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006), we 
found no evidence that having high social power afforded high personal power, or vice versa. 
This latter result was unexpected and surprising; the notion that high social power affords 
freedom and autonomy is strongly ingrained in theoretical thinking (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
& Anderson, 2003).  
One implication of the pattern of results obtained in Study 1 is that social and personal 
power should co-vary at low levels of power, but not at high levels of power. To test this 
novel prediction and to ensure that the findings obtained in Study 1 were not solely an 
artefact of the particular method used, in Study 2 we examined associations between social 
and personal power that emerged from self-report measures. The results indicated that 
variations in social power were associated with changes in personal power when personal 
power was low, but not when personal power was high. Conversely, variations in personal 
power were associated with changes in social power when social power was low, but not 
when social power was high. This pattern of results suggests that the association between 
social and personal power varies across the power spectrum, and weakens with increasing 
levels of power. All in all, the present findings point to a need to revise our model, removing 
the link between high social and high personal power. Figure 9 depicts our revised model and 
summarises the relationship between social and personal power. 
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Figure 9. Revised theoretical model depicting the relationship between social and personal 
power. 
 
In what follows, we discuss potential reasons for the unexpected dissociation between 
high social and high personal power. We then turn our attention to our revised model as a 
whole and discuss implication for current theorising and empirical work. We conclude with 
an outline of potential avenues for future research.  
Why Does Elevated Influence Not Beget Elevated Autonomy? 
Modern leaders are expected to take the interests of their subordinates into account 
and work hard to advance them—in particular in the modern, Western workplace with its 
strong focus on a democratic exercise of positions of power. Indeed, almost all modern 
theories of leadership such as Transformational Leadership (Bass, 1997; Bass & Avolio, 
1994; Bass & Riggio, 2006) or Leader-Member Exchange Theory (Dansereau, Graen, & 
Haga, 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) stress the need for leaders to be attentive to the ideas 
and priorities of their followers, in order to be personally successful in their exercise of 
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power. Although these approaches are certainly beneficial to organizations, they undoubtedly 
restrain leaders in their experience of autonomy. Furthermore, modern evaluation procedures 
have strongly reduced the degree of autonomy exercised by modern managers in middle and 
even top-management and have opened them up to increased scrutiny by others in the 
organization (Ikramullah, Van Prooijen, Iqbal, & Ul-Hassan, 2016; Jenks, 1991). Such 
developments may explain why having greater social power and in general being higher in 
the hierarchy does not increase feelings of personal power.  
This may be further bolstered by the fact that many people disapprove of ‘hard’ uses 
of power (Ng & Tajfel, 1982), and such dispositions are likely to predict how power is 
wielded (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). Furthering this point, it has been argued that 
power often serves an evolutionary function by imposing differential roles on the members of 
groups, with low power parties motivated to offset the costs of high power parties, by 
providing prestige and status offerings. In this view, the high power party has a duty to 
provide for the low power party, ultimately benefiting the group as a whole. However, when 
this duty is neglected, and a dominance relationship is enforced, high power positions may 
provide more unequivocal opportunity to the powerful (Price & Van Vugt, 2014). This would 
suggest that, although feelings of personal power and opportunity may sometimes arise from 
social power, responsibility might often be a salient and typifying feature of social power (see 
Fuligni, 1998; Tost, Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). 
Implications 
As people are generally motivated to increase their autonomy (Lefcourt & Telegdi, 
1971), it is often assumed that influence is likely to be construed, and wielded, in service of 
autonomy (Inesi et al., 2011; Lammers et al., 2016; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). The present 
findings highlight intriguing disparities in the way social power is experienced by those who 
have and those who lack it. When reporting their general beliefs, people often view social 
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power in a favourable light as a means to obtain opportunities (Zhong, Magee, Maddux, & 
Galinsky, 2006) and to achieve happiness (Mondillon et al., 2005). Thus people’s anticipation 
of what it is like to wield power may be overly optimistic, and this might spur a desire for 
social power as observed by Lammers et al. (2016). One potential explanation for these 
biased perceptions may be that it is easier to bring to mind exemplars of power-holders who 
lack responsibility (e.g., tyrannical leaders, fat cat bankers), than those who do not. 
Interestingly, when the potential baggage of responsibility is made salient people seem to 
appreciate the drawback of social power (Lammers et al., 2006).  
Turning to impaired states, the present findings suggest that personal power implies 
social power but not vice versa, suggesting that one must be sufficiently able to control one’s 
own outcomes (i.e., personal power) before one is able to control other’s outcomes (i.e., 
social power). In this sense, personal power may be more fundamental than social power (for 
further discussion see Inesi et al., 2011). In particular, a lack of personal power leaves one 
powerless in the most basic sense—dependent on external influences and subject to potential 
threats. In contrast, a lack of social power does not need to be threatening and merely means 
the absence of the exercise of social control. However, after a sufficient level of personal 
power has been obtained (perhaps reaching baseline levels) different forms of power may 
manifest independently of one another. This view aligns with the wider literature on self-
determination (e.g., Lefcourt & Telegdi, 1971), and with the fact that the consequences of 
impaired personal power appear to be far more severe than those of impaired social power 
(e.g., Maier & Seligman, 1976). 
Pratto (2016) recently highlighted a number of shortcomings and inconsistencies that 
arise from traditional perspectives that define social power as a relational construct (e.g., 
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). To overcome these limitations, Pratto proposed a conceptual re-
focus on power as a state of being able to achieve one’s goals. Our theoretical model concurs 
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with Pratto’s emphasis on low autonomy as a key defining feature of powerlessness. 
However, whilst, as we have seen, power may provide a route to restore impaired autonomy, 
the present work also suggests that high social power cannot be equated with a state of high 
autonomy. Instead, high levels of influence appear to be a critical feature to distinguish high 
social power from neutral or baselines states. 
Related to the previous point, the present work highlights once again the importance of 
including neutral or baseline conditions in empirical research on power (cf., Moskowitz, 
2004). Personal power fosters greater decisiveness and confidence (Johnson & Kilmann, 
1975; McKinney, 1975), goal-directness (Seeman, 1963), and superior performance in 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Plares, 1968) as well as tasks requiring intuition (e.g., Lefcourt & 
Telegdi, 1971). The same behavioural and cognitive signatures have also been attributed to 
high social power, typically based on studies that compare the performance of low and high 
power individuals. Evidently, such an approach is inadequate to discern any effects of high 
social power above and beyond the high levels of autonomy that one would expect to observe 
in baseline participants.  
Future Research 
We have argued that an increase in social power may not necessarily increase personal 
power because with every increase in discretionary abilities and control, individuals also gain 
additional responsibilities and are faced with an additional increase in scrutiny—in a linear 
fashion. That said, Lammers and colleagues’ (2016) last study provides some indication that 
social power (hierarchy) may confer personal power (autonomy) at the very top levels of 
organizations. Here, members of the organization reach the unique position that they no 
longer have anyone above them in the hierarchy, to evaluate or control them—at least not in 
the same organization. Current empirical research is often not geared towards capturing 
phenomena that operate at the top end of the power spectrum, and this is an important avenue 
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for future research. In a related vein, future research should examine how the impact of high 
social power is moderated by factors that impact powerholders’ autonomy, such as, for 
example, critical stakeholders or a democratic, 360-degree evaluation system (Atkins & 
Wood, 2002; Dansereau et al., 1975). 
The present work suggests that a critical ingredient to empowering individuals is not 
their own social power, but the absence of others’ control. This may have ramifications for 
policies aimed at alleviating health and other inequalities. Future research should explore in 
more depth factors that shape individuals’ experiences of low personal power, and how those 
experiences may be altered.  
Strengths and Weaknesses 
We believe the episodic priming task used in Study 1 is a strength of the current 
research because it provides a means of sampling people’s actual experiences, thereby 
addressing concerns as to the validity of artificially construed power-situations (e.g., role 
assignment; Swanner & Beike, 2015). Moreover, it is generally accepted that the details of 
recalled experiences, although susceptible to bias (e.g., Tafarodi, Marshall, & Milne, 2003), 
are epistemically robust (e.g., Christianson, 2014), and when focused around specific events, 
represent a valid source of information as to the general and salient features of said events 
(e.g., Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004).  
A limitation of our work is that our meta-analytic approach focused on central 
tendencies which may obscure important differences between samples. Indeed, variations 
between studies were often significant (as evidenced by the  statistics that accompanied the 
forest plots; see Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). This may be due to a variety 
of factors such as age, occupation, or, most importantly, geographical location as participants 
were sampled from the US, UK, Germany, and India. We know power is construed 
differently in different countries, and it may well be the case that the association between 
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influence and autonomy depends on the cultural context. For example, high social power may 
be associated with a greater sense of responsibility and lower autonomy in Eastern cultural 
settings (e.g., Zhong et al., 2006). There is a need for further comparative research on 
hierarchical relations across cultures.  
Conclusions 
The aim of the present research was to clarify the relationship between high and low 
levels of social and personal power. We found that, contrary to popular belief, everyday 
episodes of high social power did not imply high personal power (nor vice versa). However, 
episodes of low personal power coincided with low social power (but not vice versa). This 
suggests that the association between influence (personal power) and autonomy (social 
power) grows weaker with increasing levels of power. These findings hold relevance for our 
understanding of low and high power as an overarching construct.   
 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   24 
 
References 
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in 
humans - critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74. doi: 
10.1037//0021-843x.87.1.49 
Anderson, C., John, O. P., & Keltner, D. (2012). The Personal Sense of Power. Journal of 
Personality, 80, 313-344. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00734.x 
Atkins, P. W., & Wood, R. E. (2002). Self-versus others' ratings as predictors of assessment 
center ratings: Validation evidence for 360-degree feedback programs. Personnel 
Psychology, 55, 871-904. doi: 10.1111/j.1744-6570.2002.tb00133.x 
Bass, B. M. (1997). Does the transactional–transformational leadership paradigm transcend 
organizational and national boundaries? American Psychologist, 52, 130-139. doi: 
10.1037/0003-066X.52.2.130 
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1994). Improving organizational effectiveness through 
transformational leadership. London: Sage Publications. 
Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. (2006). Transformational leadership. New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Chen, S., Lee-Chai, A. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). Relationship orientation as a moderator of 
the effects of social power. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 173-
187. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.173 
Cichocka, A., Golec de Zavala, A., Marchlewska, M., Bilewicz, M., Jaworska, M., & 
Olechowski, M. (2016). Personal control decreases narcissistic but increases non-
narcissistic in-group positivity. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Christianson, S.-A. (2014). The handbook of emotion and memory: Research and theory. 
New York: Psychology Press. 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   25 
 
Cumming, G. (2013). The new statistics why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7-29. doi: 
10.1177/0956797613504966 
Dansereau, F., Graen, G., & Haga, W. J. (1975). A vertical dyad linkage approach to 
leadership within formal organizations: A longitudinal investigation of the role 
making process. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 13(1), 46-78. 
doi: 10.1016/0030-5073(75)90005-7 
Dépret, E., & Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and power: Some cognitive consequences 
of social structure as a source of control deprivation. In G. Weary, F. Gleicher & K. 
Marsh (Eds.), Control motivation and social cognition (pp. 176-202). New York: 
Springer. 
French, J. R., Raven, B., & Cartwright, D. (1959). The bases of social power. In J. M. 
Shafritz, J. S. Ott & Y. S. Jang (Eds.), Classics of organization theory (pp. 311-320). 
Boston: Cengage Learning. 
Fuligni, A. J. (1998). Authority, autonomy, and parent–adolescent conflict and cohesion: A 
study of adolescents from Mexican, Chinese, Filipino, and European backgrounds. 
Developmental Psychology, 34, 782-792. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.34.4.782 
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 453-466. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.3.453 
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). 
Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and 
dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1450-1466. doi: 
10.1037/a0012633 
Graen, G. B., & Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based approach to leadership: 
Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   26 
 
Applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. The Leadership Quarterly, 6(2), 
219-247. doi: 10.1016/1048-9843(95)90036-5 
Hedges, L. V. (1981). Distribution Theory for Glass's Estimator of Effect size and Related 
Estimators. Journal of Educational Statistics, 6(2), 107-128. doi: 
doi:10.3102/10769986006002107 
Higgins, J., & Green, S. (2011). Cochrane handbook for systematic reviews of interventions 
(Vol. 4). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Higgins, J., Thompson, S. G., Deeks, J. J., & Altman, D. G. (2003). Measuring inconsistency 
in meta-analyses. British Medical Journal, 327, 557-560. doi: 
10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557 
Hodgins, H. S., & Knee, C. R. (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In E. 
Deci & R. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 87-100). New 
York: The University of Rochester Press. 
Ikramullah, M., Van Prooijen, J.-W., Iqbal, M. Z., & Ul-Hassan, F. S. (2016). Effectiveness 
of performance appraisal: Developing a conceptual framework using competing 
values approach. Personnel Review, 45, 334-352. doi: 10.1108/PR-07-2014-0164 
Inesi, M. E. (2010). Power and loss aversion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 112, 58-69. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.01.001 
Inesi, M. E., Botti, S., Dubois, D., Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2011). Power and 
choice: Their dynamic interplay in quenching the thirst for personal control. 
Psychological Science, 22, 1042-1048. doi: 10.1177/0956797611413936 
Jenks, J. M. (1991). Do your performance appraisals boost productivity? Management 
Review, 80(6), 45-47.  
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   27 
 
Johnson, B. L., & Kilmann, P. R. (1975). Locus of control and perceived confidence in 
problem-solving abilities. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 31, 54-55. doi: 
10.1002/1097-4679 
Kahneman, D., Krueger, A. B., Schkade, D. A., Schwarz, N., & Stone, A. A. (2004). A 
survey method for characterizing daily life experience: The day reconstruction 
method. Science, 306, 1776-1780. doi: 10.1126/science.1103572 
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. 
Psychological Review, 110, 265-284. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265 
Knee, C. R., Neighbors, C., & Vietor, N. A. (2001). Self-determination theory as a 
framework for understanding road rage. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 
889-904. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02654.x 
Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile regression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2012). Power increases social 
distance. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3, 282-290. doi: 
10.1177/1948550611418679 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., Rink, F., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). To have control over or to be 
free from others? The desire for power reflects a need for autonomy. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 42, 498-512. doi: 10.1177/0146167216634064 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., & Stapel, D. A. (2009). Differentiating social and personal power: 
Opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach 
tendencies. Psychological Science, 20, 1543-1549. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02479.x 
Laurin, K., Fitzsimons, G. M., Finkel, E. J., Carswell, K. L., Vandellen, M. R., Hofmann, W., 
. . . Brown, P. C. (2016). Power and the pursuit of a partner's goals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 110, 840-868. doi: 10.1037/pspi0000048 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   28 
 
Lefcourt, H. M., & Telegdi, M. S. (1971). Perceived locus of control and field dependence as 
predictors of cognitive activity. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 37, 
53-56. doi: 10.1037/h0031280 
Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. (1976). Learned helplessness: Theory and evidence. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 105, 3-46. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.105.1.3 
McKinney, J. P. (1975). The development of values: A perceptual interpretation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 801-807. doi: 10.1037/h0076709 
Modood, T., Berthoud, R., Lakey, J., Nazroo, J., Smith, P., Virdee, S., & Beishon, S. (1997). 
Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage. London: Policy Studies 
Institute. 
Mondillon, L., Niedenthal, P. M., Brauer, M., Rohmann, A., Dalle, N., & Uchida, Y. (2005). 
Beliefs about power and its relation to emotional experience: A comparison of Japan, 
France, Germany, and the United States. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
31, 1112-1122. doi: 10.1177/0146167205274900 
Moskowitz, D. (2004). Does elevated power lead to approach and reduced power to 
inhibition? Comment on Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003). Psychological 
Review, 111, 808-811. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.808 
Neff, K. D., & Harter, S. (2002). The role of power and authenticity in relationship styles 
emphasizing autonomy, connectedness, or mutuality among adult couples. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 19, 835-857. doi: 10.1177/0265407502196006 
Ng, S. H. (1982). Power and intergroup discrimination. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Social Identity and 
Intergroup Relations (pp. 179-206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Olweus, D. (1994). Bullying at school: Long-term outcomes for the victims and an effective 
school-based intervention program. In L. Huesmann (Ed.), Aggressive Behavior: 
Current Perspectives (pp. 97-130). New York: Springer. 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   29 
 
Plares, E. J. (1968). Differential utilization of information as a function of internal-external 
control. Journal of Personality, 36, 649-662. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1968.tb01498.x 
Pratto, F. (2016). On power and empowerment. British Journal of Social Psychology, 55, 1-
20. doi: 10.1111/bjso.12135 
Price, M. E., & Van Vugt, M. (2014). The evolution of leader–follower reciprocity: the 
theory of service-for-prestige. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 363. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00363 
Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Conspicuous consumption versus utilitarian ideals: 
How different levels of power shape consumer behavior. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45, 549-555. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.005 
Rusbult, C. E., & Buunk, B. P. (1993). Commitment Processes in Close Relationships - an 
Interdependence Analysis. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 10, 175-
204. doi: 10.1177/026540759301000202 
Russell, B. (2004). Power: A new social analysis. London: Routledge. 
Schwartz, D., Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., & Bates, J. E. (1997). The early socialization of 
aggressive victims of bullying. Child Development, 68, 665-675. doi: 
10.2307/1132117 
Seeman, M. (1963). Alienation and social learning in a reformatory. American Journal of 
Sociology, 69, 270-284. doi: 10.1086/223585 
Sheldon, K. M., Kasser, T., Houser-Marko, L., Jones, T., & Turban, D. (2005). Doing one's 
duty: Chronological age, felt autonomy, and subjective well-being. European Journal 
of Personality, 19, 97-115. doi: 10.1002/per.535 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   30 
 
Swanner, J. K., & Beike, D. (2015). Throwing you under the bus: High power people 
knowingly harm others when offered small incentives. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 37, 294-302. doi: 10.1080/01973533.2015.1081851 
Tafarodi, R. W., Marshall, T. C., & Milne, A. B. (2003). Self-esteem and memory. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 29-45. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.29 
Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: Wiley. 
Tost, L. P., Gino, F., & Larrick, R. P. (2012). Power, competitiveness, and advice taking: 
Why the powerful don’t listen. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 117(1), 53-65. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.10.001 
Tost, L. P., Wade-Benzoni, K. A., & Johnson, H. H. (2015). Noblesse oblige emerges (with 
time): Power enhances intergenerational beneficence. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 128, 61-73. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.03.003 
Van Dijk, E., & Vermunt, R. (2000). Strategy and fairness in social decision making: 
Sometimes it pays to be powerless. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36(1), 
1-25. doi: 10.1006/jesp.1999.1392 
Van Dijke, M., & Poppe, M. (2006). Striving for personal power as a basis for social power 
dynamics. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 537-556. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.351 
Weaver, C. N. (1977). Relationships among pay, race, sex, occupational prestige, 
supervision, work autonomy, and job satisfaction in a national sample. Personnel 
Psychology, 30, 437-445. doi: 10.1111/j.1744-6570.1977.tb00436.x 
Zhong, C.-B., Magee, J. C., Maddux, W. W., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, culture, and 
action: Considerations in the expression and enactment of power in East Asian and 
Western societies. In Y. R. Chen (Ed.), National Culture and Groups (Research on 
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER   31 
 
Managing Groups and Teams) (Vol. 9, pp. 53-73). Bingley: Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited.
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL POWER – SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS        1 
 
Supplementary Materials 
Table S1. Summary of conditions, and corresponding power manipulations, employed in the current and previous studies. 
 Condition N Manipulation (Recall a time/experience in which…) 
Lammers et al., 2009 
 
High Personal 36 ...you personally had power, where you were independent from the influence of others. This 
means that you could fully determine what you yourself would do or get. 
 High Social 38 ...you had power over others, where you controlled and directed other people. This means that 
you could determine what these others should do or what they would get. 
 Neutral 38 ...you went to the shops. 
Lammers et al., 2016, Study 4a High Personal 55 ...you were free and independent to control your own fate. 
 High Social 48 …you were trying to influence or control other people. 
 Low Personal 52 ...you were not free and independent to control your own fate. 
 Low Social 50 ...you were not trying to influence or control other people. 
Lammers et al., 2016, Study 4b High Personal 45 ...you were free and independent to control your own fate. 
 High Social 37 ...you were trying to influence or control other people. 
 Low Personal 54 ...you were not free and independent to control your own fate. 
 Low Social 45 ...you were not trying to influence or control other people. 
Study 1 High Personal 60 ...you were not dependent on the actions of another individual or individuals, and you felt that 
you had complete control over what would, or did, happen to you. 
 
High Social 58 ...someone else was dependent on your actions, and you felt that you had complete control over 
what would, or did, happen to another individual or individuals. 
 
Low Personal 60 ...you were dependent on the actions of another individual or individuals, and you felt that you 
had no control over what would, or did, happen to you. 
 
Low Social 61 ...no one else was dependent on your actions, and you felt that you had no control over what 
would, or did, happen to another individual or individuals. 
 
Neutral 59 ...you went to the supermarket. 
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Table S2. Influence and autonomy as a function of social and personal power, in all samples.  
  Lammers et al., 2009 Lammers et al., 2016,  
Study 4a 
Lammers et al., 2016,  
Study 4b 
Study 1 
 
Influence Autonomy Influence Autonomy Influence Autonomy Influence Autonomy 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
High Social  7.28 1.17 6.17 1.39 4.94 0.94 4.29 1.44 5.18 0.69 5.31 1.18 7.17 1.55 6.67 2.01 
High Personal  6.38 1.54 7.45 1.08 2.96 1.52 5.98 1.05 5.02 1.01 5.75 0.93 3.61 2.41 6.83 2.31 
Neutral 5.02 1.72 6.79 1.58 - - - - - - - - 4.09 2.06 6.22 2.39 
Low Social  - - - - 2.73 1.33 4.92 1.67 4.75 1.17 5.08 1.33 2.76 1.88 5.14 2.61 
Low Personal  - - - - 2.22 1.39 1.98 1.16 4.33 1.42 4.09 1.78 2.96 1.66 3.39 1.81 
NB. Study 1 and Lammers et al. (2009) employed 9-point scales, whereas Lammers et al. (2016) employed 7-point scales.
 
